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Abstract
In this paper, we study a model economy that can account for the distribution of pay-
ments within a day. In our model, debtors choose when to arrive at the settlement
location. Concomitant with choosing their arrival, debtors are making a production
decision. We assume there is a cost to arriving early; that is, late-arrival is associ-
ated with a technology that dominates early arrival/production. Second, we treat the
debtor’s choice as hidden from creditors. We derive conditions under which the plan-
ner allocates production to each type of agents. In the decentralized setting, there is
a nonarbitrage condition that is consistent with a positive intraday rate. The central
bank may be able to implement the planner’s allocation with a proper intraday interest
rate. In some cases, the optimal intraday rate is positive.
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1 Introduction
In his seminal paper, Freeman [7] examined a model economy in which settlement risk is
present. In Freeman’s overlapping generations framework, a debtor borrows to consume
when young and settles with the creditor when old. Settlement risk arises because there is
a locational shock; debtors and creditors may not settle directly because their arrivals and
departures are non-synchronous. This locational friction is the source of liquidity problem
in Freeman’s model: creditors leaving before their debtors arrive will seek to sell their IOUs
in the resale market to creditors who have already been paid. If too few creditors have been
paid, there is too little liquidity to pay par value on the IOUs and the early-leaving creditors
suﬀer. With central bank liquidity provision, full insurance is achieved and the equilibrium
in the decentralized market is the eﬃcient allocation.1
The purpose of this paper is to extend Freeman’s analysis in two specific areas. First,
we develop a model economy in which the distribution of settlements is endogenously deter-
mined.2 The implication is that we can account for an endogenous, nondegenerate distribu-
tion of settlements within the day. Debtors choose when they will arrive at the settlement
location — either in the morning or in the afternoon — by choosing when they will produce.
1Others have asked whether the central bank’s discount window is necessary. Green [10] showed that the
central bank’s discount window was not necessary to solve the liquidity problem. The eﬃcient allocation could
be implemented by using private money could instead of central bank money. Mills [16] solved a mechanism
design problem, demonstrating the equivalence between Freeman’s economy with an active discount window
and an economy in which perfect record keeping exists. Thus, the liquidity problem is a by-product of
imperfect record keeping.
2Note that the average daily volume settled through Fedwire and CHIPs is $7.3 trillion. The Federal
Reserve has voiced concern about the volume of large payments settled late in the day. Operational risk
is heightened by increasing the potential magnitude of liquidity dislocation (see [2]). Armantier et al. [2]
document that, on average, twenty percent of the payments are settled before 1 pm with the remaining
eighty percent being settled after 1pm.
Angelini [1] considers a framework in which there is a network externality that induce banks to delay
settlement. He studies this problem in a partial equilibrium framework.
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(Hereafter, debtors will be identified as morning producers or afternoon producers according
to their production decision.) In our model, young debtors oﬀer IOUs to creditors to obtain
inputs for the production process. The production decision is a hidden action so that the
creditor cannot oﬀer one contract to morning producers and another to afternoon producers.
Further, we assume that for a given quantity of inputs, afternoon production will generate a
larger quantity than morning production. In the decentralized economy, equilibrium consists
of both morning and afternoon production. In equilibrium, there is a nonarbitrage condi-
tion. The marginal debtor is indiﬀerent between morning and afternoon production because
morning producers receive capital gains on IOUs purchased in the resale market. Indeed,
the capital gains exactly oﬀset the higher returns that come with afternoon production. So,
some measure of producers are willing to produce in the morning, knowing that the com-
bination of morning production returns and capital gains compensates them for eschewing
afternoon production. The intraday return on IOUs is positive and there is a nondegenerate
distribution of settlements.
Second, Freeman’s policy involves buying the IOUs frommorning-leaving creditors at face
value and having the afternoon-arriving debtors settle the IOUs held by the central bank.
The intraday discount window loans are oﬀered at zero interest. The zero intraday rate is
optimal in one version of our model. In particular, Freeman-type creditors are those whose
consumption needs are unrelated to their locational shock. For these creditors, afternoon
goods are perfect substitutes for morning goods. For this model economy, the eﬃcient
production schedule has zero morning production. In the absence of a discount window, the
equilibrium in the decentralized economy does not achieve the optimal allocation. By setting
the intraday rate at zero, the central bank eliminates capital gains in the IOU resale market.
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It follows that the equilibrium distribution of settlements is degenerate with all settlements
occurring in the afternoon.
We further extend the analysis to consider an economy in which the creditor’s locational
shock coincides with a consumption shock. More specifically, creditors who leave the set-
tlement location in the morning derive utility from consuming in the morning. To these
creditors, afternoon goods are no longer perfect substitutes for morning goods. In this way,
we consider the role of time-sensitive consumption opportunities. With concomitant loca-
tion and consumption shocks, the planner’s production plan will have to take into account
whether endowments are large enough to provide full insurance to morning consumers. If
the economy’s endowments are large enough, no morning production occurs in the planner’s
allocation. A zero intraday interest rate can implement the planner’s allocation. If the
economy’s endowments are too small, then a positive intraday rate is necessary; otherwise,
the morning-leaving creditors’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution will exceed the
morning-producer’s marginal product of the capital at a zero intraday rate. Combined with
a tax-transfer policy, a positive intraday rate can implement the eﬃcient allocation provided
there is no morning production. However, a positive intraday rate cannot achieve the ef-
ficient allocation if morning production is positive. In this version of the model economy,
the intraday rate appears in both the morning producers’ and the creditors’ intertemporal
decisions. For creditors, the intraday rate is the price of morning consumption relative to
the afternoon consumption and is positive when the marginal product of the morning good
is less than the marginal product of the afternoon good. One policy tool, in general, cannot
simultaneously correct two (eﬃciency) conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the economic environment in Section 2.
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In Section 3, we define and characterize the equilibrium in the decentralized market. The
planner’s allocation is characterized in Section 4. Government policies that will implement
the planner’s allocation are derived in Section 5. In Section 6, we consider a modified
economy in which morning goods and afternoon are imperfect substitutes. A brief summary
and conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2 The physical environment
We consider a modified version of the payment system model developed by Freeman [7]. The
key diﬀerence is that young debtors acquire factor inputs from creditors. The production
finances old-age consumption by debtors. The production schedule also determines when
the debtors arrive to settle their IOUs.
Time and location: There is an infinite sequence of time periods. Dates are indexed by
t = 1, 2, .... At each date t, there are two subperiods, called morning and afternoon. There
are a large number of paired islands distributed around a central island. Each island pair
consists of a creditor island and a debtor island. On the central island, there is an enforcement
authority that costlessly enforces all contracts. In addition, a monetary authority exists on
the central island.
Agents: At the beginning of each period, there is a continuum of measure one of two-period
lived agents born on each island. Agents born in a creditor (debtor) island are called creditors
(debtors). At date t = 1, there are a continuum of both creditors and debtors who live only
one period, hereafter referred to as the initial old.
Endowments: Young debtors are endowed with x units of a perishable island-specific con-
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sumption good. Young creditors are endowed with y units of a perishable island-specific
consumption good. To abuse notation a little bit, we also call debtor’s and creditor’s en-
dowed goods good x and good y, respectively. The initial old debtors are endowed with good
x, and the initial old creditors are endowed with m0 units of fiat money.
Production technology: There are two technologies available to young debtors. In both
cases, a technology converts good y at one-to-one rate into capital, producing goods. With
k units of date-t capital, the morning production technology converts f (kt) into date-t+ 1
units of goods available in the morning. Alternatively, the afternoon-production technology,
denoted F (kt), transforms k units of date-t+1 goods into the afternoon good. Note that for
a given finite input kt, the production of the afternoon good strictly dominates the morning
good; that is, F (k0) > f (k0) for any k0 > 0. We assume that the functions f(k) and F (k)
are strictly increasing, strictly concave.3
Preferences: For a creditor born at date t, lifetime welfare is represented by a utility
function u(yc1t, xc2t+1), where yc1t is his consumption of good y in his first period of life and
xc2t+1 is his consumption of good x in his second period of life. Creditors learn which island-
specific debtor good they want when old. For a debtor born at date t, lifetime welfare is
described by v(xd1t, xd2t+1), where xd1t and xd2t+1 are his consumption of good x in his first and
second periods of life, respectively. Both utility functions are separable, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and satisfy the Inada condition in both arguments.
Travel and trade patterns: For each date t ≥ 0, a young debtor starts by travelling to
the paired creditor island. He wants to purchase good y from the young creditors, using the
3Freeman [9] specifies a model in which production is present. There is no distinction between morning
and afternoon production in Freeman’s model.
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input in production. As young creditors do not derive utility from debtor’s good and the
young debtor does not have money, the young debtor oﬀers a debt contract, called an IOU,
to the young creditors in exchange for a quantity of the y good. The IOU is settled next
period when old debtors arrive on the central island. After obtaining good y, the debtor
returns to his home island and starts to produce using either the morning or the afternoon
production technology. Later in the period, he sells some of his endowed good x in exchange
for fiat money to the old creditors who are randomly relocated to his island and to the old
debtors who return to their home island. He uses fiat money in the next period to settle
IOUs or to buy goods from the young generation.
Young debtors are now divided between being morning producers and afternoon produc-
ers. Let λ be the measure of debtors choosing to be morning producers, while 1 − λ is the
measure of debtors choosing to be afternoon producers. In the next period, an old debtor
travels to the central island to settle IOUs in the morning (afternoon) if he is a morning
(afternoon) producer. After settling IOUs, the old debtor returns to his home island. No
one can observe the young debtor’s production choice. The production choice is publicly
observed next period when the debtor arrives to settle the IOU.
A young creditor stays on his home island. He sells some of his endowed good to the
young debtors and obtain IOUs. He travels to the central island in the next morning to settle
the IOUs. Let 1 − α denote the probability that the old creditor has to leave the central
island by noon (morning-leaving creditors). So, α is the probability that the old creditor
stays until the afternoon (afternoon-leaving creditors). When leaving the central island, an
old creditor is relocated randomly, following a uniform distribution, to a debtor island. This
relocation identifies the type of date-t+ 1 good x that gives utility to the old creditors.
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IOU contract: An IOU contract specifies the nominal value of the debt. It is expected
to be settled at par in the next period (either morning or afternoon) on the central island.4
IOUs can be redeemed by either fiat money or real goods. At the time the IOU is issued,
creditors know α, the morning departure rate for old creditors, and take the believed value
of λ as given.
IOU resale market: When the morning-leaving creditors leave the central island, the
IOUs issued by the afternoon producers have not been redeemed yet. The morning-leaving
creditors can sell the unredeemed IOUs in a resale market. Potential buyers are those
arriving at the central island in the morning and leaving during the afternoon subperiod;
that is, afternoon-leaving creditors and morning producers.
3 The decentralized economy
3.1 Debtor’s problem
All markets in our model are competitive. A young debtor compares the lifetime utilities from
producing the morning good and the afternoon good given the goods prices, the resale price
of the loan, and his believed measures of morning and afternoon producers. Let the lifetime
utilities of a morning producer and an afternoon producer be represented by v
¡
xd1t, xd2t+1
¢
and v
¡
xd∗1t , xd∗2t+1
¢
, respectively. Throughout our analysis, we will use the superscript “∗” to
denote the quantities related to afternoon producers and afternoon-leaving creditors. The
debtor’s decision rule is straightforward: choose the technology that results in higher lifetime
4In the appendix, we also consider an IOU contract that is contingent on the timing of payments. All
results in the text hold under such a contract.
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utility. If v
¡
xd1t, xd2t+1
¢
= v
¡
xd∗1t , xd∗2t+1
¢
, a debtor is indiﬀerent to becoming either a morning
or an afternoon producer. In this case, we assume that λ represents the probability that
a particular debtor will be a morning producer. By law of large numbers, λ is also the
measure of debtors that are morning producers and arrive on the central island to settle in
the morning. In what follows, we describe a debtor’s problem by the production choice.
3.1.1 Morning producer
A morning producer faces the following budget constraints when young:
pytyt = ht
pxtx = pxtxd1t +mt
where pxt and pyt are the prices of goods x and y in period t, respectively, mt is the quantity
of money acquired, the quantity of y purchased by exchanging a nominal quantity of IOUs,
denoted here by h. The morning producer transforms the y good into capital, denoted k,
at a one-for-one rate. When old, a morning producer arrives on the central island in the
morning and faces the following budget constraint
pxt+1f(kt) +mt − ht + bt+1
¡
1− ρt+1
¢
= pxt+1xd2t+1
bt+1 is the par value of the IOUs he purchases in the date-t + 1 resale market, and ρt+1 is
the date-t + 1 price of those IOUs. Note that under this constraint, debtors are capable of
meeting their their old-age needs — consumption and settlement — through a combination
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of production, outside money and gains from IOU purchases. Money holdings by the old
debtors need not be equal to IOU values.5
We form the monring producer’s life-time budget constraint, obtaining
pxt+1f(kt) + pxt
¡
x− xd1t
¢
− pytkt + bt+1
¡
1− ρt+1
¢
= pxt+1xd2t+1 (1)
x− xd1t ≥ 0 (2)
The morning producer faces a liquidity constraint in the loan resale market:
pxt+1f(kt) + pxt
¡
x− xd1t
¢
− pytkt − ρt+1bt+1 ≥ 0 (3)
which says the morning producer cannot borrow to purchase the IOUs.
A morning producer thus solves the following maximization problem
maxxd1t,xd2t+1,kt,bt v(dx
d
1t, dxd2t+1)
s.t. (1) − (3) .
The first-order conditions for the morning producers are
¡
x− xd1t
¢µ
v1
¡
xd1t
¢
− v2
¡
xd2t+1
¢ pxt
pxt+1
1
ρt+1
¶
= 0 (4)
f 0 (kt)−
pyt
pxt+1
= 0
v2
¡
xd2t+1
¢ 1− ρt+1
pxt+1
− μ1ρt+1 = 0
5To illustrate, suppose that the old debtor used production returns to settle debt, taking the money to
the home island to purchase goods from young debtors. Money is used only to execute intergenerational
transfers. The key point is some combination the real bills doctrine and fiat money coexists.
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where μ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with an early producer’s liquidity constraint.
From the complementary slack condition, it follows that ρ = 1 is satisfied if and only if the
liquidity constraint in unbinding. If the liquidity constraint is binding, we obtain a case in
which ρ < 1.
3.1.2 Afternoon producer
If a debtor chooses to be an afternoon producer, his budget constraints when young are
pxtx = pxtxd∗1t +m
∗
t
pytk∗t = h
∗
t
When old, the debtor will not be able to trade in the loan resale market as he arrives
late. The late producer’s budget constraint when old is
pxt+1F (k∗t ) +m
∗
t − h∗t = pxt+1xd∗2t+1
The afternoon producer’s life-time budget constraint is
pxt+1F (k∗t ) + pxt
¡
x− xd∗1t
¢
− pytk∗t = pxt+1xd∗2t+1 (5)
x− xd∗1t ≥ 0 (6)
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So that an afternoon producer solves the following maximization problem:
maxxd∗1t ,xd∗2t+1,k∗t v(x
d∗
1t , xd∗2t+1)
s.t. (5)− (6) .
The first-order conditions for the afternoon producer’s problem are:
¡
x− xd∗1t
¢µ
v1
¡
xd∗1t
¢
− v2
¡
xd∗2t+1
¢ pxt
pxt+1
¶
= 0 (7)
F 0 (k∗t )−
pyt
pxt+1
= 0
3.2 Creditor’s problem
A young creditor sells some of his endowments for IOUs. His budget constraint is
lt + pyyct = pyy, (8)
where lt denotes the nominal value of the IOUs issued at date-t and carried over to the
date-t+ 1 settlement location.
A young creditor faces uncertainty regarding the timing of departure from the central
island when old. In the event that the creditor is a morning-leaver, settlement may not occur
because some of his debtors may not arrive in the morning. If unsettled, the morning-leaver
will oﬀer the IOUs in the resale market. The budget constraint for an old morning-leaving
creditor is:
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ρt+1 (1− at) lt + atlt = pxt+1xc2t+1, (9)
where at is the proportion of the IOUs that are issued at date t and settled during the
date-t+1 morning. It follows that 1−at is the proportion of IOUs sold in the resale market.
With these resources, the old-age creditor can purchase units of the consumption good from
debtors (either young or old or both). We assume that creditors can trade debtor island-
specific goods with each other on the central island. So if the IOUs are paid in goods, the
creditors can convert it to his preferred debtor island-specific goods.
If, in contrast, the old creditor leaves in the afternoon, the creditor will settle all of his
IOUs on the central island. He can also make arbitrage profits in the resale market by
purchasing IOUs at discount from morning-leavers and settling with the afternoon-arriving
debtors. This creditor’s old-age budget constraint is:
lt +
¡
1− ρt+1
¢
qt+1 = pxt+1xc∗2t+1 (10)
where qt+1 denotes the par value of the IOUs that an old afternoon-leaving creditor purchases
in the date-t + 1 resale market. The sum of the creditor’s old-age resources are used to
purchase units of the consumption good.
The liquidity constraint for an afternoon-leaving creditor is
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atlt − ρt+1qt+1 ≥ 0. (11)
Thus, a creditor solves the following life-time maximization problem:
maxlt,qt,yc1t,xc2t+1,xc∗2t+1 (1− α)u
¡
yc1t, xc2t+1
¢
+ αu
¡
yc1t, xc∗2t+1
¢
s.t. (8)− (11) .
Substitute yc1t, xc2t+1, xc∗2t+1 using lt and qt+1, the first-order conditions with respect to lt and
qt for this problem are:
− u1 (yc1t) +
£
(1− α)u2
¡
xc2+1
¢ ¡
at + ρt+1 (1− at)
¢
+ αu2
¡
xc∗2t+1
¢¤ pyt
pxt+1
+ pytμ2λ = 0
(12)
αu2
¡
xc∗2t+1
¢ 1− ρt+1
pxt+1
− μ2ρt+1 = 0, (13)
where μ2 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with creditor’s liquidity constraint. If
the liquidity constraint is not binding, then by (13) we have ρt+1 = 1 and xc2t+1 = xc∗2t+1.
Combining the two FOCs, we get,
−u1 (y
c
1t)
pyt
+
¡
at + ρt+1 (1− at)
¢Ã
(1− α)
u2
¡
xc2t+1
¢
pxt+1
+ α
1
ρt+1
u2
¡
xc∗2t+1
¢
pxt+1
!
= 0. (14)
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3.3 Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is defined as (i) price-taking debtors and creditors maximize expected
lifetime welfare; (ii) all markets clear; and (iii) the believed measure of debtors arriving at
the central island in the morning is equal to the actual measure of debtors arriving in the
morning.
The goods market clearing conditions are
y = yc1t + λkt + (1− λ) k∗t ,
x+ λf (kt−1) + (1− λ)F
¡
k∗t−1
¢
= λ
¡
xd1t + x
d
2t
¢
+ (1− λ)
¡
xd∗1t + x
d∗
2t
¢
+ (1− α)xc2t + αxc∗2t .
In additon, the market for good x in the morning need to satisfy
x+ λf (kt−1) ≥ λxd1t + (1− λ)xd∗1t + (1− α)xc2t.
The inequality does not have to bind because good x can be sold to the old debtors and
afternoon-leaving creditors in the afternoon.
The money market clearing condition is
λmt + (1− λ)m∗t = m0
The loan market clearing condition is
lt = λht + (1− λ)h∗t .
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The equilibrium proportion of debts that is repaid early is
at =
λht
λht + (1− λ)h∗t
.
The loan resale market clearing condition is
λbt + αqt = (1− α) (1− at−1) lt−1. (15)
The first-order conditions and the market clearing conditions pin down the equilibrium
amount of consumption goods for both agents, the relative prices of goods, the equilibrium
ratio of morning producers, and the equilibrium price of loans in the resale market. Proposi-
tion 1 shows that in the equilibrium, there will be a fraction of, but not all, debtors choosing
to be morning producers. The resale price of loan on the central island is always less than
1, that is, the liquidity constraints are always binding in the resale market.
Proposition 1 There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, λ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Moreover, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Suppose λ = 1, which implies that all debtors are early
producers. All IOUs are redeemed in the morning. There is no demand in the IOU resale
market, which implies in unbinding liquidity constraints for morning producers and results
in ρ = 1. The morning producers will not gain at all from the resale market. As the return
on the afternoon good strictly dominates that on the morning good, a debtor would have
become an afternoon producer if ρ = 1. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
Suppose alternatively that all debtors are afternoon producers; that is, λ = 0. Then
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there is no supply of liquidity in the IOU resale market, which drives the discount rate ρ to
0. One debtor would choose to be a morning producer to make infinite profit in the resale
market. Again, a contradition.
That λ is strictly between 0 and 1 implies that a debtor is indiﬀerent to the technologies
given the equilibrium λ. That is, a debtor cannot benefit from technology arbitrage in
equilibrium.
v(xd1t, x
d
2t+1) = v(x
d∗
1t , x
d∗
2t+1).
The implication of proposition 1 is that there exists a nondegenerate equilibrium distri-
bution of settlements. In this equilibrium, the debtor is indiﬀerent between morning and
afternoon production/settlement. Intuitively, debtors follow a mixed strategy in order to
satisfy the nonarbitrage condition. Once at the settlement site, the morning producers can
find creditors leaving early and oﬀer payment at less than par for the IOUs. Because there is
no default risk, the return to morning goods plus intra-period gains from the resale market
equal the return on the afternoon goods.
In the following sections, we will focus on the stationary equilibrium, or the steady state.
In the steady state, prices and allocations are invariant to time. So we will drop the time
subscripts.6
6The uniqueness of the steady state is not guaranteed. But the uniquess exists in some classes of utility
functions and production functions. For example, log linear utility function and Cobb-Douglas production
functions.
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4 Planner’s allocation
We now turn to the discussion of the unconstrained first-best allocation, or a planner’s
allocation. We assume that the planner selects one technology for each individual debtor.
Thus, in the planner’s allocation, λ is the measure of debtors that the planner chooses to be
morning producers. In this section, we assume old creditor’s consumption demand is not tied
to their departure from the central island. It is the same assumption as made in Freeman
(1996). Later, we consider a diﬀerent consumption pattern in Section 6.
Following Mills (2004), we set up a social planner’s problem as follows.
maxyc1,xc2,xc∗2 ,xd1 ,xd2 ,xd∗1 ,xd∗2 ,k,k∗,λ β
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
λv
¡
xd1, xd2
¢
+
(1− λ) v
¡
xd∗1 , xd∗2
¢
⎤
⎥⎥⎦+ (1− β)
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
αu (yc1, xc∗2 )+
(1− α)u (yc1, xc2)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
s.t. x+ λf (k) + (1− λ)F (k∗) = (1− α)xc2 + αxc∗2 + λ
¡
xd1 + xd2
¢
+ (1− λ)
¡
xd∗1 + xd∗2
¢
y = yc1 + λk + (1− λ) k∗
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
where β is the weight of debtors in the planner’s welfare function. The first two constraints
are the resource constraints for goods x and y, respectively.
The solution to the planner’s problem, denoted by the “hat” on the variables, satisfies
the following first-order conditions that describe the consumptions for each type of agents
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in both periods:
v1
¡
xˆd∗1
¢
= v2
¡
xˆd∗2
¢
, (16)
v2
¡
xˆd∗2
¢
=
1− β
β
u2 (xˆc∗2 ) , (17)
u1 (yˆc1) = u2 (xˆ
c∗
2 )F
0
³
kˆ∗
´
, (18)
xˆc2 = xˆ
c∗
2 . (19)
Because the old creditors are indiﬀerent to when they consume in the second period of their
life and because afternoon production dominates morning production, the planner’s alloca-
tion consists only of afternoon production; that is, kˆ = 0 and λˆ = 0. The planner provides
full risk sharing to creditors. A morning-leaving creditor’s consumption is not aﬀected by
his departure from the central island because the planner provides the consumption good
during the appropriate subperiod. A planner can always redistribute goods to achieve the
desired wealth distribution that satisfies equation (17).
Compare the decentralized economy and the planner’s allocation. It is easy to see that
the decentralized economy does not achieve the planner’s allocation. Two reasons account
for this. First, in a decentralized economy, IOUs must be discounted to attract some of
the debtors to arrive early. While the resale market provides liquidity for morning-leaving
creditors, it shifts production to a low-return technology, reducing total consumption and
incomplete risk sharing among creditors. In a planner’s economy, the planner maximizes
total production, distributing goods to the creditors at the appropriate consumption time
and providing full risk sharing. Second, the planner achieves the optimal allocation by
costlessly redistributing goods to satisfy equation (17).
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5 Government policies
So, the equilibrium outcomes in the decentralized economy are not the same as the planner’s
allocation. Is there a policy in the decentralized economy that will implement the eﬃcient
allocation?
There exists a central bank on the central island. The central bank provides a discount
window service that supplies unlimited loans at the interest rate of 1 + r in the morning of
each period. Only intraday loans are oﬀered; loans made in the morning must be repaid in
the afternoon. We assume that the central bank keeps the end-of-period stock of fiat money
constant for all periods.7 In this economy, the afternoon-leaving creditors and morning
producers trade between the central bank and morning-leaving creditors as “commercial
banks.” The competitive market will result in a non-arbitrage condition in which ρ = 1
1+r .
In addition to the central bank, a government operates a lump-sum tax and trans-
fer process. We use the vector (Td, Td∗ , Tc, Tc∗) to denote the tax-transfer scheme, where
Td, Td∗, Tc, Tc∗ are the net life-time transfers to the morning-producer, afternoon-producer,
morning-leaving creditor, and afternoon-leaving creditors, respectively.8 The government
runs a balanced budget in each period. We look for an optimal discount rate on the resale
loan that can maximize the social welfare in the decentralized economy.
Proposition 2 In the decentralized economy, the optimal intraday rate is zero.
Proof. Let ρ = 1, Td∗ > Td, and Tc = Tc∗ . Because there is no profit in the resale market
7Central bank loans can be considered outside money. The constant stock of outside money referred to
here then is "unbacked" outside money. Any outside money created through the discount window is "backed"
outside money, where backing refers to the loan itself. For example, suppose the central bank loan is repaid
with goods. For this case, we assume that the central bank can sell the goods on the debtor islands. In this
way, central bank loans are equal to zero at the end of each period.
8The lump-sum tax and transfer scheme is implicit in [7] and other works (see [16]). The balanced-budget
constraint is (1− λ)Td + (1− α)Tc + λTd∗ + αTc∗ = (1− ρ) [(1− α) (1− λ) l − λb− αq].
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and afternoon producers receive transfers, debtors will produce the afternoon good only. The
debtor’s first-order condition (7) is reduced to (26). Because there is no profit in the resale
market and all creditors receive the same transfers/tax, creditors receive same consumption.
Thus, we have xc2 = xc∗2 and the creditor’s first-order condition (14) is reduced to (18). Lastly,
the value of Td∗ and Tc∗ can be chosen in such a way that the marginal utility between two
types of agents satisfies (16) .
As in Freeman, Proposition 2 indicates that morning-leaving creditors do not care about
when they obtain consumption goods during the day; early departure imposes a pure liquidity
problem. The bank can counteract this friction by injecting money temporarily into the
economy.
6 Diamond-Dybvig type creditor
In this section, we consider an economy in which the locational shock to old creditors is
perfectly correlated with a consumption shock. In other words, creditors that leave the
central island in the morning must also consume in the morning. As such, afternoon goods
cannot substitute for morning goods from the perspective of old morning-leaving creditors.
Note that endowments are available for morning consumption and thus are perfect substitutes
for the morning good.
In our view, we are incorporating a friction in which resource commitment corresponds
to settlement time. Martin and McAndrews [14] assert, “... banks face a variety of deadlines
to make payments during the day.” (p.17) By assuming that morning and afternoon goods
are imperfect substitutes, we are treating one possible deadline as consistent with the timing
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of consumption. Insofar as the timing of consumption matters, production may also be
aﬀected. There is an opportunity cost that is present as the planner shifts production from
the afternoon to the morning. Let "Freeman-type" creditors refer to those creditors who treat
morning goods and afternoon as perfect substitutes, such as in the previous model economy.
Compared with Freeman-types, creditors asymmetrically distinguish between morning goods
(apples) and afternoon goods (oranges) in this modified model economy. For afternoon
departees, apples and oranges are perfect substitutes. For the morning leavers, oranges are
useless.9 Thus, by shifting production to morning apples, we get fewer total goods for the
afternoon leavers for the sake of the morning leavers.
By modelling the possible link between payment receipts and consumption purchases,
we treat the possibility that there is a one-for-one link between when the creditor needs
to be paid and a consumption opportunity. Formally, we can study the implications of a
model in which the creditor, whose settlement takes place in the morning, is also seeking the
consumption good at exactly the same time as settlement occurs. We refer to these creditors
as Diamond-Dybvig [6] creditors.10
6.1 Planner’s allocation
The planner faces an additional resource constraint. Because the morning good is diﬀerent
from the afternoon good, there must be enough mornign good to meet the consumption
9See Martin [13] for a Diamond-Dybvig economy with commodity money. Because of the resources
associated with the commodity money, the loan interest rate should be positive in this economy.
10In their paper, Diamond-Dybvig consumers are subject only a consumption shock. We realize that we
take some liberty since our consumers are subject to joint consumption and location shocks.
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needs by morning-leaving creditors. Formally,
x+ λf (k) ≥ (1− α)xc2 (20)
Three cases are associated with this constraint.
Case 1: The resource constraint (20) is nonbinding, implying that (1− α) xˆc2 < x and
λˆ = 0. Then the planner’s solution is identical to allocation with Freemn-type creditors.
Case 2: The resource constraint (20) is binding, and the planner’s solution requires λˆ = 0
and (1− α) xˆc2 = x. In this case, the planner still invests all resources in the production of
afternoon goods. He rations the endowments of the young debtors among the morning-
leaving creditors. The planner’s solution is described by equations (16) − (18) and the
resource constraint. Because of the binding resource constraint and by concavity of the
utility function, we have
xˆc2 < xˆ
c∗
2 . (21)
Case 3: The resource constraint (20) is binding, and the planner’s solution requires λˆ > 0
and (1− α) xˆc2 > x. The planner invests some resources in producing the morning goods, and
allocates the endowments of the young debtors and morning goods to the morning-leaving
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creditors. The first-order conditions are
xˆd1 = xˆ
d∗
1 , (22)
xˆd2 = xˆ
d∗
2 , (23)
u1 (yˆc1) = u2 (xˆ
c
2) f
0
³
kˆ
´
, (24)
u2 (xˆc2) f
³
kˆ
´
− u1 (yˆc1) kˆ = u2 (xc∗2 )F
³
kˆ∗
´
− u1 (yˆc1) kˆ∗. (25)
and equations (16)− (18) . (21) still hold in this case. Equation (25) describes the tradeoﬀ
embedded in the production allocation. The left-hand side of (25) is the marginal value
from an inputs applied to morning production while the right-hand side is the marginal
value obtained from inputs applied to afternoon production. The optimal λ equates the
net marginal gain of these two types of production. Also note that equations (16) , (22),
and (23), imply the following equation for a morning producer’s intertemporal consumption
decision:
v1
¡
xˆd1
¢
= v2
¡
xˆd2
¢
(26)
The return on morning good production is lower than that on the afternoon good. Be-
cause the endowments of the young debtors and morning goods are perfect substitutes to the
morning-leaving creditors, the planner first applies the endowment to satisfy the consump-
tion by morning-leaving creditors. Case 1 verifies that if the amount of endowment is large
enough to satisfy old morning creditors’ demand, then the planner’s allocation achieves full
risk sharing. In contrast, if the endowment is not large enough, the planner finds the eﬃcient
trade-oﬀ between the morning-leaving creditor’s intertemporal marginal rate of intertempo-
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ral substitution (IMRS) and the marginal product (MP) of the morning production. If, when
evaluated at the endowment quantity, the IMRS is higher than MP, the planner will simply
ration the endowment of the young to the morning-leaving creditors (Case 2). In contrast,
if the IMRS is less than the MP when evaluated at the endowment quantity, the planner’s
allocation will consist of both morning and afternoon production. In the eﬃcient allocation,
morning good production is set to equate IMRS and MP (Case 3). Both Cases 2 and 3 are
characterized by the planner’s allocation achieving partial risk sharing in the sense that the
morning-leaving creditors consume less than afternoon-leaving ones. In those two cases, the
planner compensates the creditor by increasing their consumption when young. Investment
declines. Thus, compared with Case 1, it follows immediately that there is less afternoon
production and less total production in Cases 2 and 3.
6.2 Equilibrium in the decentralized economy revisited
With λ > 0, it is easy to see that the equilibrium in the decentralized economy does not
achieve the planner’s allocation for Cases 1 and 2. Though less obvious, the Case 3 planner’s
allocation is not achieved in the decentralized economy. Note that the planner’s allocation
calls for v1
¡
xˆd1
¢
= v2
¡
xˆd2
¢
; that is, morning producer’s IMRS is equal to one. However, in
the decentralized economy with 0 < ρ < 1, the morning producer’s optimal choice requires
v1
¡
xd1
¢
> v2
¡
xd2
¢
by the first-order condition. In other words, morning producer’s IMRS is
less than one.
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6.3 Government policies
We discuss optimal central bank policies in three cases in the economy with Diamond-Dybvig
type of creditors, corresponding to the three separate planner’s solutions.
Case 1: (1− α) xˆc2 < x
The planner’s solution has an unbinding resource constraint in the morning. The solution
is characterized by the same system of equations as in the economy with Freeman type of
creditors. The optimal discount rate is ρ = 1, and the policy in the decentralized economy
can implement the planner’s allocation.
Case 2: (1− α) xˆc2 = x and λˆ = 0.
Suppose the discount rate policy ρ = 1. The creditor’s first-order condition is
u1 (yc1) = F
0 (k∗) [(1− α)u2 (xc2) + αu2 (xc∗2 )] .
If xc2 = xc∗2 , the creditor’s FOC is identical to equation (18). But xc2 = xc∗2 contradicts the
planner’s allocation with xˆc2 < xˆc∗2 .
There exists a positive intraday interest rate policy that does implement the planner’s
allocation. To achieve λ = 0 in the decentralized economy, Td can be set suﬃciently low
to induce all debtors to be afternoon producers. The afternoon producer’s decision is inde-
pendent of ρ. Let ρ =
u2(xˆc∗2 )
u2(xˆc2)
=
u2(xˆc∗2 )
u2( x1−α)
,so that the creditor’s first-order condition in the
decentralized economy becomes
u1 (yc1) = F
0 (k∗)
∙
(1− α) u2 (xˆ
c∗
2 )
u2 (xˆc2)
u2 (xc2) + αu2 (x
c∗
2 )
¸
. (27)
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It is easy to see that
³
yˆc1, kˆ∗, xˆc∗2 , xˆc2
´
is the solution to (27), which is identical to (18).
Hence, with ρ =
u2(xˆc∗2 )
u2(xˆc2)
, the quantity produced in the decentralized economy is identical the
planner’s production level.
Aggregate transfers are represented by (1− α)Tc + αTc∗ + Td∗ = (1− ρ) (1− α) l. Note
that the aggregate transfers are funded by profits made from the discount window loans.
The tax-transfer scheme can be designed to achieve the desirable consumption allocation
among all agents. ("consumption allocation" may be too general. We mean the desirable
welfare weights, right?)
Case 3: (1− α) xˆc2 > x and λˆ > 0.
In this case, there does not exist an intraday interest rate policy that can implement the
planner’s allocation. To see this, note that ρ appears both in the morning producer’s and
the creditor’s intertemporal consumption decisions, [see equations (4) and (14)]. Equation
(4) is not identical to equation (26) in the planner’s first-order condition, unless ρ is set to
be 1. With ρ = 1, equation (14) in steady state becomes
u1 (yc1) = (1− α)u2 (xc2) f 0 (k) + αu2 (xc∗2 )F 0 (k∗) ,
which is not identical to the intertemporal consumption decisions in the planner’s solution
(equations (18) and (24)) unless we have xc2 = xc∗2 . But it contradicts the fact that xˆc2 < xˆc∗2
in the planner’s solution.
We summarize the discussion to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the economy with Diamond-Dybvig type creditors, (i) if the planner’s
resource constraint in the morning is nonbinding (Case 1), then setting ρ = 1 (or r = 0)
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implements the planner’s allocation; (ii) if the planner’s resource constraint in the morning
is binding and the resource equals the consumption by morning-leaving creditors (Case 2),
then setting ρ =
u2(xˆc∗2 )
u2(xˆc2)
(or r =
u2(xˆc2)
u2(xˆc∗2 )
− 1) implements the planner’s allocation; (iii) if
endowments are strictly less than consumption by morning-leaving creditors (Case 3), then
no intraday rate can implement the planner’s allocation.
The intuition behind proposition 3 is as follows. In the planner’s allocation, the morning-
leaving (afternoon-leaving) creditor’s IMRS is equal to the marginal product of morning (af-
ternoon) production. Compared with the afternoon-leaving creditors, the morning-leavers
are treated less favorably (at most equally) because morning goods are more costly. The in-
traday rate in the decentralized economy, which measures the price of morning consumption
relative to the afternoon consumption, should be positive to match the planner’s consump-
tion allocation among the creditors. However, this positive intraday rate also measures the
IMRS of the morning producers, who trade high return on production for profits in the resale
market. From the planner’s point of view, debtor’s IMRS should be one because the con-
sumption needs of the debtors (either morning or afternoon producers) are time-insensitive
within a period. In other words, to match the planner’s consumption allocation for the
morning producers, we need to set the intraday rate at 0. So in general, the one intraday
rate cannot achieve the eﬃcient IMRS of the morning producers (which requires r = 0) and
the creditors (which requires r ≥ 0).
The exception occurs in cases 1 and 2. In Case 1, the endowments of the young debtors are
large enough to satisfy the consumption demand of the morning-leaving creditors. Morning
consumption does not come at the cost of afternoon consumption. The timing issue becomes
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a pure liquidity problem as in the economy with Freeman-type creditors, and providing free
liquidity can solve the problem. In Case 2, endowments are not large enough, but the
morning-leaving creditor’s IMRS, evaluated at the endowment point, is still large relative to
marginal product in the morning production. By imposing a heavy tax onmorning producers,
we can induce all debtors to be afternoon producers. The intraday rate, therefore, can be
used exclusively to target the intertemporal eﬃciency condition of the creditors.
Alternatively, let us expand on this intuition by focusing attention on the planner’s
production scheme. Three variables fully characterize the production scheme in the planner’s
allocation: (i) the fraction of debtors who are engaged in morning good production (λ), (ii)
the quantity of capital invested in morning good production (k), and (iii) the quantity of
capital put in afternoon good production (k∗). In Case 3, all three variables are nontrivial
and must be matched for the decentralized economy to implement the planner’s allocation.
The government has two policy tools: the intraday rate and tax-transfer scheme. It follows
that the policy tools are outnumbered by variables that fully characterize the planner’s
production scheme. So we cannot achieve the planner’s allocation in general.11 Again, cases
1 and 2 are special. In these two cases, there is no morning production in the planner’s
production scheme. By setting taxes on morning producers high enough, we encourage all
debtors to choose afternoon production. With λ = 0, the choice of k is trivial. Hence, we
have only one variable, k∗, in the planner’s production scheme that must be matched. By
setting the positive intraday interest rate properly, we can adjust the creditors’ IMRS such
that k∗ = kˆ∗.
A secondary and subtle reason accounts for why central bank policies cannot implement
11See appendix for the discussion of a time-contingent IOU contract.
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the planner’s allocation in Case 3. Hidden action plays an important role in terms of the
relative price of capital. Debtors’ production choices are not observable ex ante. As creditors
cannot distinguish between morning and afternoon producers, they cannot sell capital at
diﬀerent prices to debtors who invest in diﬀerent production. Thus, there is one price of
capital despite two types of production, and the choices of k, and k∗ are both distorted.12
In the economy with Freeman-type creditors, the tax-transfer scheme merely redistrib-
utes consumption among all agents to achieve the desirable welfare weights in the planner
allocation. In the economy with Diamond-Dybvig creditors, the tax-transfer scheme also
aﬀects the capital gains in the IOU resale market. In case 2, for example, the optimal in-
traday rate is positive. It follows that capital gains are earned by purchasing IOUs in the
morning and settling them in the afternoon. With no tax-transfer scheme, some debtors
would choose to be morning producers if the intraday rate is high enough. To implement the
eﬃcient allocation with a degenerate distribution of settlements, the government must tax
morning producers. Here, the tax cancels capital gains and only afternoon production takes
place. In case 3, the tax-transfer scheme adjusts the size of the capital gains. The planner’s
allocation cannot be achieved, but the tax-transfer scheme, together with a positive intraday
rate, is second best.
Case 2 follows a theme in the literature on the Friedman rule. In separate papers,
Martin and McAndrews [14] and Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin [4] demonstrate that in
an economy with production externalities, the optimal policy will deviate from the Friedman
rule.13 In Bhattacharya, et al., the relocation shock is distinguished between early movers
12See appendix for the discussion of an economy with no hidden action.
13See also [15]. Our paper also overlaps substantially with [12] in addressing settlement risk with monetary
policy tools. In [12], paying the market rate of interest on reserves is analogous to the Friedman rule.
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and late movers. Early movers impose a cost on society in the form of reduced production.
Intraday interest rates and overnight rates play two distinct roles. The overnight rate aﬀects
output, while the intraday rate aﬀects the distribution of resources between money holders
and non—money holders. It is optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule because a positive
overnight rate reduces the incentive to overuse money and encourages risk sharing. Here,
the externality is embodied in the production of morning goods versus afternoon goods. For
afternoon leavers, there is a single consumption good and shifting production to the morning
results in a loss of the total quantity of goods. With a positive intraday interest rate, morning
creditors/consumers realize less consumption to compensate for the lower marginal product
that comes with shifting production from afternoon to morning.
Some related literature favoring positive intraday rate emphasizes moral hazard problem.
Chapman and Martin [5] develop a model in Freeman’s [8] framework to show that in an
economy with moral hazard problem, the optimal intraday rate is positive if default occurs.14
With a positive intraday rate, creditors are encouraged to use resources to monitor the quality
of the loans thus reducing the default risk. Our model provides an alternative explanation
that relies on the opportunity cost of settling payments early.
The literature on the endogenous distribution of settlements is thin. Bech and Garrett
[3] apply a partial equilibrium approach to examine the distribution of settlements. Banks
receive payment requests and strategically choose when to release the funds to settle the
payment request. In a collateralized credit regime when liquidity is costly, there arises a
prisoners’ dilemma that yields a degenerate distribution of settlements that occur in the
afternoon. This equilibrium is socially ineﬃcient. In a priced credit regime, there can arise
14See also [14] for a survey of literature on intraday money market.
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a stag hunt game in which either all banks settle all in the morning or all in the afternoon.
Delay is socially optimal when the payment flows are skewed towards the afternoon. By
proposing a general equilibrium framework, we can address the role that the intraday rate
policy has on the equilibrium distribution of settlements.
6.4 A numeric example (Diamond-Dybvig type of creditor)
In this example, utility functions are: v
¡
xd1t, xd2t+1
¢
= lnxd1t + lnxd2t+1, and u
¡
yc1t, xc2+1
¢
=
ln yc1t + lnxc2t+1. Creditors and debtors are equally weighted. That is, β = 0.5.
Endowments: x = 0.2, y = 1.
Production functions: f (k) = k1/3, F (k) = 22/3k1/3.
Figure 1 shows the weighted average expected utility of the debtors and creditors (social
welfare) in a decentralized economy, a planner’s economy, and a decentralized economy with
central bank policies. The blue line represents the utility in a decentralized economy, the
black line indicates the utility in a planner’s economy, and the red line indicates the utility
under the optimal central bank policies when the planner’s allocation is not achievable. We
also plot the weighted average utility under the zero-intraday-rate policy and the tax-transfer
scheme when zero intraday rate is not optimal. It is represented by the green line.
If the fraction of late-leaving creditors, α, is greater than fifty percent, then the first-stage
resource constraint is not binding in the planner’s allocation. That is, x > (1− α) xˆc2. In
the decentralized economy, the central bank will want to choose ρ = 1 to implement the
planner’s allocation. This is why the central bank policy welfare line coincides with the
planner’s welfare line for α ≥ 0.5.
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Figure 1 further shows what happens when 0.36 ≤ α < 0.50. Here, the first-stage resource
constraint is binding in the planner’s problem so that x = (1− α) xˆc2. The optimal discount
rate that the central bank sets is ρ =
u2(xˆc∗2 )
u2(xˆc2)
< 1. This central bank policy implements the
planner’s allocation. The central bank policy welfare line also coincides with the planner’s
welfare line for 0.36 ≤ α < 0.50. For α < 0.36, no discount rate can implement the planner’s
allocation, and the welfare is strictly less than that under the planner’s allocation. However,
the allocation is better than the decentralized economy without the central bank policies. If
the central bank insists on providing zero intraday rate, social welfare is stricly worse oﬀ. In
the figure, we observe that the green line is below the black line and the red line. It is even
worse than that under no policy intervention if α is suﬃciently small.
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Figure1: An example of the social welfare under the planner’s allocation,
decentralized economy, and the decentralized economy with the central bank policies.
Table 1 lists the details of the decentralized economy, planner’s allocation, and the de-
centralized economy with central bank policies for α = 0. The consumptions and utilities of
the debtors and creditors, and the weighted average aggregate utility, ω, are as follows:
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Table 1: An example of the allocation in a decentralized economy,
planner’s allocation, and central bank policies (α = 0)
v xd1 xd2 k xd∗1 xd∗2 k∗
Decentralized economy −2.0999 0.2000 0.6124 0.3750 0.2000 0.6124 0.7500
Planner’s allocation −1.6372 0.4411 0.4411 0.5411 0.4411 0.4411 0.5411
Optimal policies −1.3863 0.3162 0.7906 0.2500 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
0-intraday rate −0.9751 0.6141 0.6141 0.3772 0.6141 0.6141 0.7543
u yc1 xc2 xc∗2 λ ρ ω
Decentralized economy −1.8767 0.5000 0.3062 0.6124 0.6667 0.5000 −1.9883
Planner’s allocation −1.9442 0.4589 0.3119 0.4411 0.1521 N.A. −1.7907
Central bank policies −2.3026 0.5000 0.2000 0.5000 0.0000 0.4000 −1.8444
0-intrady rate −3.0133 0.2457 0.2000 0.6141 0.0000 1 −1.9942
When α = 0, the zero-intrady rate is not optimal in the decentralized economy with
central bank policies. As Table 1 shows, the welfare under zero intraday rate is even lower
than under no policy intervention. The optimal central bank policy requires positive intraday
rate and a tax-transfer policy (Td/px = 0.0479, Td∗/px = 0.1094, Tc/px = 0.0000, Tc∗/px =
−0.1094). Note that given the discount rate ρ = 0.4000 and the tax-transfer scheme, no
debtors will choose the first-stage production. The chance of being treated unfavorably
when old adversely aﬀects the creditor’s consumption decision when young. The young
creditors choose to consume more and sell less capital, which reduce the total production
and thus the consumption of other agents.
7 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we derive three main results. First, we develop a model economy in which
the timing of payment settlement is endogenously determined. Thus, there is an equilibrium
distribution of settlements within a day.
Second, we use this model economy to study optimal intraday interest rate policy. In
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the first version of the model, we follow Freeman’s approach, treating morning consumption
and afternoon as perfect substitutes. Under this assumption, we show that a zero-intraday
interest rate policy is optimal. In addition, the zero-intraday-rate policy achieves perfect
risk sharing for consumers. Because the morning and afternoon goods are perfect substi-
tutes, allocating all resources into high-return afternoon production maximizes aggregate
consumption. Lastly, the equilibrium distribution of settlements is degenerate with all pay-
ments settled in the afternoon. The empirical evidence indicates that a preponderance of
settlements occur in the afternoon.
Third, we consider a version of the model economy in which morning goods and afternoon
goods are not perfect substitutes. In this version, there is a perfect correlation between a
locational shock and the consumption-timing shock. The critical feature is whether produc-
tion needs to be shifted to the morning so that morning consumers can eat. In two cases,
the endowments are insuﬃcient to obtain perfect risk sharing. In both cases, a positive
intraday interest rate is necessary; the intraday rate is the relative price between afternoon
and morning consumption. In one case, the positive intraday rate is part of a policy package
that implements the planner’s allocation. In this case, the morning consumer’s intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution is greater than the rate at which capital is transformed
into morning goods when evaluated at the endowment quantity. The eﬃcient allocation is
characterized by afternoon production only with the morning consumer realizing lower con-
sumption than the afternoon consumer. In the other case, when evaluated at the endowment
quantity, the morning consumer’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is less than the
rate at which capital is transformed into the morning good. Therefore, some production is
shifted from the afternoon to the morning. The morning consumer realizes lower consump-
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tion than the afternoon consumer. And the reduction in the afternoon production means
fewer goods are available for all other agents. For this last case, the intraday rate policy
is positive. There is no intraday rate policy that can implement the eﬃcient allocation.
Because central bank policy cannot implement the planner’s allocation, a third policy tool
must be considered.
Overall, our findings indicate that the nature of settlements and the timing of consump-
tion tied to settlement are potentially important factors when examining optimal intraday
interest rate policy. It seems quite plausible that creditors will have time-sensitive con-
sumption opportunities present themselves. When the settlement timing is endogenously
determined, we derive conditions under which welfare is harmed by adopting a zero intraday
interest rate policy. We leave the question about the appropriate policy structure for future
research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 A contingent IOU contract
Consider a contingent IOU contract. If redeemed in the morning, the debtor pays the face
value (without loss of generality). Otherwise, the debtor pays 1 + γ times the nominal
value of the production loan. To simplify the presentation, we only consider the steady
state equilibrium. First we show that the equilibrium discount rate and interest rate on the
production loan satisfy ρ (1 + γ) = 1.
A creditor can choose γ diﬀerent from the equilibrium rate to attract morning or afternoon
producers. Let γ∗ be the equilibrium interest rate of the production loan. If a creditor chooses
to oﬀer γ > γ∗, only morning producers will buy from him. If he chooses γ < γ∗ (and charge
a small interest rate on the production loan made to the morning producers), he will attract
only the afternoon producers. Thus, the fraction of the loan that will be repaid in the
morning is
a =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if γ < γ∗,
λk
λk + (1− λ) k∗ , if γ = γ
∗,
1, otherwise.
Also note that if a creditor oﬀers γ < γ∗, he will oﬀer γ → γ∗ to maximize his income when
old.
Suppose the creditor oﬀers market interest rate γ∗. He maximizes his expected life-time
utility subject to the budget constraints contingent on the realization of his type and the
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liquidity constraint if he leaves in the afternoon.
maxq,yc1,xc2,xc∗2 (1− α)u (yc1, xc2) + αu (yc1, xc∗2 )
s.t. [ρ (1 + γ∗) (1− a) + a] py (y − yc1) = pxxc2
[(1 + γ∗) (1− a) + a] py (y − yc1) + (1− ρ) (1 + γ∗) q = pxxc∗2
apy (y − yc1)− ρ (1 + γ∗) q ≥ 0
Solving the maximization problem, we have
−u1 (yc1) +
py
px
[a+ ρ (1 + γ∗) (1− a)]
µ
(1− α)u2 (xc2) +
1
ρ
αu2 (xc∗2 )
¶
= 0
and
xc2 = ρx
c∗
2 .
Observing the life-time budget constraint of a morning-leaving creditor and by the condi-
tion that ρxc∗2 = xc2, we find the following: if ρ (1 + γ∗) > 1, a creditor’s life-time budget (in
both states) is maximized given the prices if a = 0. Whereas if ρ (1 + γ∗) < 1, his life-time
budget is maximized if a = 1. Therefore, a creditor has incentive to lower his oﬀering interest
rate if ρ (1 + γ∗) > 1 to sell only to the afternoon producers and raise his oﬀering interest
rate if if ρ (1 + γ∗) < 1 to sell only to the morning producers. Only if ρ (1 + γ∗) = 1, the
creditors are indiﬀerent to the value of a, and they have no incentive to make a diﬀerent oﬀer.
Therefore, the contingent IOU contract must have 1 + γ = 1/ρ, and a creditor’s first-order
condition becomes
u1 (yc1) =
py
px
∙
(1− α)u2 (xc2) +
1
ρ
αu2 (xc∗2 )
¸
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Given that 1 + γ = 1/ρ, a morning producer solves the following maximization problem
maxxd1,xd2,k,b v(x
d
1, xd2)
s.t. px
£
f(k) + x− xd1
¤
− pyk + (1− ρ) (1 + γ) b = pxxd2
x− xd1 ≥ 0
px
£
f(k) + x− xd1
¤
− pyk − ρ (1 + γ) b ≥ 0
The first-order conditions for the morning producers are
¡
x− xd1
¢µ
v1
¡
xd1
¢
− v2
¡
xd2
¢ 1
ρ
¶
= 0
f 0 (k) =
py
px
From the complementary slack condition, it follows that ρ = 1 is satisfied if and only if the
liquidity constraint in unbinding.
An afternoon producer solves the following maximization problem:
maxxd∗1 ,xd∗2 ,k∗ v(x
d∗
1 , xd∗2 )
s.t. pxF (k∗) + px
¡
x− xd∗1
¢
− (1 + γ) pyk∗ = pxxd∗2
x− xd∗1 ≥ 0
The first-order conditions for the afternoon producer’s problem are:
¡
x− xd∗1
¢ ¡
v1
¡
xd∗1
¢
− v2
¡
xd∗2
¢¢
= 0
F 0 (k∗) = (1 + γ)
py
px
=
1
ρ
py
px
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The market clearing conditions are the same as in the main text.
Re-exam of proposition 1: There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, λ ∈ (0, 1) and
ρ ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. If λ = 0, there is no morning producer. The discount rate in the resale market must
be ρ = 0 as no one buys the IOUs. If a debtor chooses to be a morning producer, he can
make infinite profits in the resale market. Thus, we reach a contradiction.
If λ = 1, there is no afternoon producer. All debts are paid in full in the first subperiod
in the central island, that is ρ = 1. It follows that γ = 0. A debtor will choose to become an
afternoon producer as the afternoon production yields higher return. Therefore, we reach a
contradiction.
In a similar way, we can prove that ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Re-exam of proposition 2: In the decentralized economy, the optimal intraday rate is
zero.
Proof. The proof is the same as in the main text.
Re-exam of proposition 3: In the economy with Diamond-Dybvig type creditors, (i) if
the planner’s resource constraint in the morning is nonbinding (Case 1), then setting ρ = 0
(or r = 1) implements the planner’s allocation; (ii) if the planner’s resource constraint in
the morning is binding and the resource equals the consumption by morning-leaving creditors
(Case 2), then setting ρ =
u2(xˆc∗2 )
u2(xˆc2)
(or r =
u2(xˆc2)
u2(xˆc∗2 )
− 1) implements the planner’s allocation;
(iii) if endowments are strictly less than consumption by morning-leaving creditors (Case 3),
then no intra-day rate can implement the planner’s allocation.
Proof. It is easy to see that in cases 1 and 2 of the planner’s allocation, we can use the same
intra-day rate policy and the tax-transfer scheme in the main text to achieve the planner’s
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allocation in a decentralized economy.
In case 3 of the planner’s allocation, we need to set ρ = 1 to satisfy (26) in the planner’s
allocation. However, ρ = 1 results in xc2 = xc∗2 , which violates the planner’s condition that
xˆc2 < xˆc∗2 . Therefore, the contingent planner does not achieve the planner’s allocation in case
3.
8.2 Observable production choice (no hidden action)
In this section, we assume that the production choice of the debtors are observable to the
creditors. The creditors can charge diﬀerent price for capital purchased by diﬀerent type of
producers. Let py and p∗y be the prices of capital for the morning and afternoon producers,
respectively.
The morning producer’s optimization problem does not change. The afternoon producer’s
optimization decision results in
¡
x− xd∗1
¢ ¡
v1
¡
xd∗1
¢
− v2
¡
xd∗2
¢¢
= 0
F 0 (k∗)−
p∗y
px
= 0
Let a and a∗ be redefined as the quantities of capital a creditor sells to morning and
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afternoon producers, respectively. A creditor solves the following problem:
maxyc1,a,a∗,xc2,xc∗2 ,q (1− α)u (yc1, xc2) + αu (yc1, xc∗2 )
s.t. pya+ ρp∗ya∗ = pxxc2
pya+ p∗ya∗ + (1− ρ) q = pxxc∗2
y = yc1 + a+ a∗
pya− ρq ≥ 0
The first-order conditions result in
py = ρp∗y
xc2 = ρx
c∗
2
xc2 = py (y − yc1)
u1 (yc1) =
py
px
∙
(1− α)u2 (xc2) +
1
ρ
αu2 (xc∗2 )
¸
The market clearing conditions are the same as in the main text.
The first-order conditions in the economy with no hidden action are the same as these
in the economy with hidden action and contingent IOU contracts. As our propositions 1-3
hold in the economy with hidden action and contingent IOUs, they also hold here. With
no hiddn action, creditors can sell capital at diﬀerent prices. In equilibrium, the prices of
capital must satisfy a non-arbitrage condition so that a creditor is indiﬀerent to morning and
afternoon producers. In an economy with hidden action, a contingent contract serves the
same purpose: in equilibrium, creditors must be indiﬀerent to the two types of producers.
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Although creditors cannot distinguish producers when they sell capital, they can vary the
interest rate to attract a particular type to eliminate hidden action. In both economies, the
results in the main text survive. In particular, if planner’s allocation requires some morning
production, no intra-day rate can achieve the planner’s allocation in a decentralized economy.
It is again because we do not have enough policy tools to match the three characteristics (λ,
k, and k∗) in the planner’s allocation.
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